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From Smooth NPMization to Structural Changes in France: Accelerated 
Reforms, Mixed Perceptions 
Philippe Bezes, Gilles Jeannot 
 
This is a preprint version of thepublished paper:  
Bezes Philippe, Jeannot Gilles (2016), “From Smooth NPMization to Structural Changes in 
France: Accelerated Reforms, Mixed Perceptions” in :Hammerschmid Gerhard, Van de Walle 
Steve, Andrews Rhys, Bezes Philippe, Public administration reforms in Europe, the view 
from the top, Edward Elgar, p. 52-61.)  
 
The French public administration has often been considered as one of the most 
« frozen » public administrations, ranked in between other continental European (Germany) 
or Southern European states (Spain or Italy). In some recent studies, France was still 
portrayed as a laggard in terms of administrative reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), 
requalified as a possible illustration of a „neo-weberian state‟ or as a main resistant to the 
influence of New Public Management ideas (Rouban, 2008), echoeing the historical success 
of French sociologist Michel Crozier‟s theory viewing France as a “stalled society” with a 
“stalled state” (Crozier, 1964; 1970). However, lessons drawn from neo-institutionalist 
theories (insisting in the national specificity of reform trajectories due to institutional 
constraints and structuring historical patterns) invite us to more diverse kind of lenses to 
describe changes and suggest how framing the analysis in terms of inertia can be rather 
misleading. Indeed,  the policies of administrative reforms have developed intensively in the 
French context as elsewhere, with specificities (Bezes, 2009; Bezes, Parrado, 2013), that may 
be related to the kind and modes of changes occurring in a „Napoleonic‟ state (Ongaro, 2009) 
or as a Continental State (see Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2011). The importance of gradual modes of 
changes or, at the opposite, upon long-term perspective in the context of resilient institutions 
have been emphasised for the French case (Bezes, 2009). Another argument is that New 
Public Management ideas did develop and diffuse in the French context but with specific 
institutional constraints (Rouban, 2008; Bezes, 2012). At last, authors have also emphasized 
the specificities of ministries, some of them (Public Work, Health, Education) developing 
 2 
their own dynamic of administrative changes and their own accommodation of managerial 
tools (Jeannot, Guillemot, 2010; Guillemot, Jeannot, 2013). With these perspectives in mind, 
this chapter offers interesting insights to emphasize how French top public officials perceive 
administrative reform policies in France in terms of trends, tools and scope.  
 
The multiple nexus of the French political-administrative institutions 
In order to provide a broad view of the French administrative institutions, four 
dimensions can be emphasized. The two first are related the degree of pervasivenessof the 
administrative system. The French state has been recognized as the archetype of a „unitary 
and centralized state‟ – a „Napoleonic state‟ - with strong national integration through a single 
territorial administrative structure (Crozier, Thoenig, 1975; Grémion, 1976). And indeed, 
national ministerial administrations have subnational units representing subdivisions of the 
national ministries both at the regional and at the départemental levels. However, second, 
these regional and départementaldirectorates are also „supervised‟ by a „prefect‟ who is an 
agent of the whole government. These lines have designed a territorially based and vertically 
integrated administrative system, both from the ministerial point of view and from the more 
political one with the political control defended by prefects. The third component is the 
existence of a complex legal entrenchment, ranging from a strong legal body of provisions 
ruling bureaucratic life as well as a statute that organizes the professional life of all civil 
servants (statut general des fonctionnaires) (Dreyfus, 2000). The French administration 
hasthus established a large and separate body of administrative law, consisting of a coherent 
legal doctrine that covered bureaucratic activities. The existence of this „rigid [legal] 
backbone‟ (Knill, 1999, p. 115) explains why any „new‟ types of ideas – such as the „new 
public management‟ movement‟ – have been filtered. The existence of specific training 
schools designed to train upper-level civil servants (at the top of them, the 
Ecolenationaled’administration, Eymeri, 2001) is another institutional related feature that 
even accentuated this trend (Bezes, Jeannot, 2011). The fourth component concerns the 
political-administrative nexus and points to the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats „at the top‟. On the political side, the French Fifth Republic is often referred to as 
a semi-presidential regime. The hybrid nature of its politico-administrative system lies in the 
fact that, although its Constitution of the 4
th
 of October 1958 has established a parliamentary 
system, both the institutional practice and the constitutional reforms have increasingly 
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strengthened the predominance of the President compared with the Prime Minister. The 
President was initially elected for seven years – while the members of the National 
Assembly‟s term lasts five years – but the constitutional reform in 2000 has made the 
president and the deputies‟ term match; both now last five years, (theoretically) reducing the 
probability of ‟cohabitation‟ between a President originating from a different party than his or 
her Prime Minister. On the administrative side, by reinforcing the presidential and 
governmental executive against the Parliament, the Fifth Republic has given great strength to 
top civil servants and has designed fairly politicised minister/mandarin relations. On the one 
hand, the French administration relies on a vast majority of state civil servants who are 
recruited through competitive exams, trained in schools and promoted through rationalized 
mechanisms. The global image that results from these mechanisms is well known: a unified 
merit and career based civil service system, traditionally associated with the idea of a strong 
state tradition (État is always capitalised) and the idea of a disinterested civil servant serving 
the general interest and guarding the public good while also promoting the principles of 
impartiality, equality, adaptability and continuity. On the other hand, forms of politicization at 
the top have always persisted and have even been continuously and growingly used as 
structuring means for steering, producing loyalty and controlling administration at higher 
level through ministerial cabinets and discretionary appointments (political loyalty is there in 
balance with expertise and competences) (for an overview, Bezes and Le Lidec 2007).  
 
The trajectory of public administrative reforms in France 
While administrative reforms did not play in France, in the eighties and nineties, the 
dominant role they had in Anglo-American and Antipodean countries and did not initially 
claim the same disruptive intentions at changing the very nature of the administrative system, 
administrative reform episodes in France have been numerous with a steadily growing 
influence of NPM devices from the nineties and more drastic reforms since the early 2000 
(Bezes, 2009). In the early 1980s, France first dealt with decentralisation policies rather than 
going on focusing on efficiency or managerial tools and the territorial decentralisation was 
first a response to concerns about the distribution of political power, not about administrative 
inefficiencies. Competences were transferred to local authorities in several domains (social 
action, housing, education, culture, transports, sea affairs) but without clearly distinguishing 
between state and sub-national governments. Although France has been historically 
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considered as a centralized state, local representatives and authorities always played a major 
role at the central level within Republican regimes in France and obtained benefits (Le Lidec, 
2001). In this context, decentralisation has always been „the‟ major early „reactive‟ reform 
that induced reinforcing effects and changed the „Napoleonic‟ state (Le Lidec, 2007, Bezes, 
Parrado, 2013), for instance with a new decentralization Act in 2003-2004.  
In the eighties, smooth administrative reforms valued service quality, user concerns, 
some managerial techniques (evaluation, contracts) and a continuing set of distinctive public 
service orientations with strong participation of public servants and control through mutuality. 
By the mid-1990s ideas, policy instruments, goals and the scope of reform were largely 
redesigned by the mid-1990s, to such an extent that the New Public Management „tool-kit‟ 
gradually became the dominant inspiration in administrative reform policies (Bezes, 2005; 
2009; 2012). At the same time, however, NPM ideas became more influent and growingly 
adopted by top bureaucrats from the French Grands corps through repeated state reform 
committees and reports (ibid.)  
As a result of these ongoing processes unleashed in the 1990s, many comprehensive 
and drastic changes have occurred since the early 2000s. The major change for the French 
administrative system – specifically in terms of adoption of NPM methods and tools - has 
come from the 2001 reform of the French budgetary procedure. The reform was voted 
through the Institutional Act on Budget Legislation (Loiorganique relative aux lois de 
finances, called “LOLF”), adopted on August 1st 2001 and implemented since January 2006. 
The 2001 Budget Act systematised the use of NPM instruments (programme-oriented 
budgets, a new performance management system, a „real cost‟ approach to policy, aggregated 
headings, constraining capping tools for staff expenditure and a new accountability 
framework for Parliament) (Bezes, 2010; Corbett, 2010). During the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the process of agencification was not absent in the French context but it was unsystematic and 
limited compared to other European countries (United Kingdom, the Netherlands) (Bezes, 
Fimreite, Le Lidec, Laegreid, 2013). The creation of new autonomous public bodies 
dominantly took the legal form of the établissements publics, used since decades for many 
already existing autonomous public bodies (Conseild‟Etat, 2012). New agencies were 
numerous in Agriculture, Health and Risk, Social Affairs, Culture and Research, within this 
legal form of établissements publics.  
After the election of President Sarkozy, a General Public Policy Review was  launched 
in July 2007 with explicit reference to the Canadian Program Review initiated by the Liberal 
Chretien Government in 1995-1996 or the „spending reviews‟ done in UK since 2002 (Bezes, 
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2010). The French RévisionGénérale des PolitiquesPubliques(RGPP) claims to engage in 
“rethinking the state” with direct ties to the fiscal imperatives of dealing with the debt and the 
deficit. From 2007 to 2012, this process of reform generated two dynamics of transformation 
of the state organizational form with sharp and specific impacts on the territorial state, the 
many ministerial field units and the prefects (Bezes, Le Lidec, 2010; Poupeau, 2011). First, 
boundaries between ministries were redrawn and the number of full ministers was 
significantly reduced leading to the creation of meta-ministries. Second, the territorial state 
administration was reorganized at the regional and the départemental levels through many 
mergers affecting nearly all state local units. Within the same General Review of Public 
policies, several austerity measures also affected the civil service (freeze on the point value of 
civil service pay from 2010, non replacement of one in two retiring civil servants). 
 
The specificities of the major trendsofreforms: high on downsizing and mergers; low on 
transparency and citizen participation 
As regards the big reform trends identified by the respondents in France (question 17), 
it is no surprise to find that the main responses describe the reforms of the last five years 
conducted under the general public policy review (RGPP) and reflect the sedimentary layers 
of previous reforms, which are perceived as less dominant and at work because a bit older. 
80% of respondents (scale 1-3)
1 identify the impact of the “Public Sector 
Downsizing” measures: they correspond to the sustained policy of cutting public sector 
employment over this period by the non-replacement of one in two retiring civil servants. 
This trend is specifically strong in the French context and is much above the COCOPS 
average (see table 1). This austerity trend is confirmed by the 69% that are opposed to the 
idea that there is and extending state provision into new areas, neatly beneath COCOPS 
average. The second item particularly identified was the policy of organizational merger 
(51%), again above the COCOPS average, which actually corresponds to the multiple 
reorganizations associated with the RGPP: mergers of central government administrations, of 
ministerial divisions at the regional level and of interministerial divisions at the départemental 
level. Associated with this is the presence of reforms focusing on collaboration and 
cooperation between different players (51%). In fact, mergers of central administrations as 
well as, systematically, of ministerial units at regional level was decided in order to increase 
                                                          
1
In this chapter, we have chosen to provide percentages (on scale 1-3) from the French sample in order to 
emphasize the way surveyed people have responded to the questionnaire. In the three figures we insert, we 
use means as the simplest way to compare French responses to their European counterparts. 
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cooperation between them. The reforms relating to performance targets and linked with the 
LOLF, first implemented in 2006 before the Sarkozy era, take a back seat. However, the 
respondents underline the importance of focusing on outcomes and results as broadly high at 
50%. These measures, clearly dominated by the downsizing theme, which has the biggest 
psychological impact and affects organizations in their operation, are nevertheless not equated 
with market type reforms: this is evidenced by the mere 9 % of responses on the question of 
“privatization” and, to a lesser degree, for “flexible employment”, external partnership and 
“contracting out”, respectively 22 %, 30% and 33%. To a significant extent, 56% of the senior 
executives also identify the progress of digital government (or e-government) as broadly 
important, but also the creation of autonomous agencies (in France, taking the form of a 
growth in public establishments), which 38% of them see as broadly important.  
Figure 1: French Top Executives‟ assessments of reform trends in comparative perspective 
 
Generally speaking, the respondents‟ perceptions and responses help defining a fairly 
accurate map of actual reforms in France. To situate France internationally, we can see a link 
between austerity policy (downsizing) and drastic reorganizations through merger bringing 
both cooperation issues to the heart of the reform process and the aim at generatingeconomies 
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of scale. Reforms of a different kind (transparency, citizen participation) attract little 
attention, at least because they were not much represented in the Sarkozy era reforms. NPM 
priorities (the focus on results; agency creation) reflect more ancient or more „low profile‟but 
solid trends of change. While France belongs to the lowest ranked countries on many trends, 
it is quite striking that downsizing, mergers and agencification are the sole three trends above 
the COCOPS European average. Structural reforms and austerity measures seem to prevail at 
the expense of changes that would rely on either market tools or citizen-oriented measures. 
Figure2 below looks now at senior executives‟ overall perceptions of the 
implementation of administrative reforms. These assessments clearly relate to the recent 
reforms introduced under the general public policy review.  
Figure 2: French Top Executives‟ assessments of the implementation of reforms in 
comparative perspective 
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emphasised in several responses. 34% of respondents see them as largely driven by politics 
(compared with 22% as driven by the senior executives), which reflects the „politics of 
conviction manifested by the „hyper President‟ Sarkozy, to describe the way Nicolas Sarkozy 
has constructed his political authority. Besides, the audits and reform plans within the General 
Review of Public Policy were initially elaborated by small closed circles of top bureaucrats and 
consultants without cooperation and negotiation with ministries. Possibly related to the views 
that recent reforms were set up by the top, far away from the ordinary problems of top 
executives, the assessments of reform effects are cagey, with 22 % seeing them as 
unsuccessful, whereas 13% consider them a success. The perception of the reforms as 
excessively intensive can be appreciated by the fact that 38% of respondents thought that there 
were too demanding, whereas only 9% thought there were not enough. The coexistence of 
mergers and downsizing may explain this perception: both are strongly demanding trends 
generating many side effects in public organisations(disorganised public policies, material 
issues related to mergers) and over public agents (trouble in identities, reshuffle of positions in 
the organisation, etc.).  
 
Reforms by Instruments: the diffusion of managerial tools in the French context 
Beyond the perception of the major reform trends, the assessment by senior civil 
servants of the instruments actually used in their parent organization is a good indicator of the 
changes underway in public administration and its intensity. In comparative perspective, the 
French top executives have declared that, in total, France has one of the weakest „equipment 
rate‟ in managerial tools in Europe, with the exception of Spain, and together with two other 
Continental countries, Germany or Austria. Like in all other countries,three instruments are 
perceived as very significant in the French context: staff performance interviews (88 %), 
management by objectives and results (69%) and business planning (59%).The stamp of 
performance management methods based on the previous reforms (LOLF) is here rather 
strong. In complement, the high score of staff appraisal, even above the COCOPS average, 
reflects the measures taken during the Sarkozy presidency, which extended the individual 
performance interview (about career development, performance, etc.) to the detriment of 
bureaucratic scoring mechanisms.  
While performance pay is not at the top of list of instruments used in France, its 
adoption is relatively advanced compared to other countries. Indeed, top bureaucrats have 
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been the leading beneficiaries of this system in France since 2006, not only to incentivize 
their conducts but also as indirect way to increase their salaries.  
Figure 3: French Top Executives‟ assessments of the perceived implementation of managerial 
tools in comparative perspective 
 
Quite significantlyin order to characterizing France (see figure 3), three types of 
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widespread. The first type is cost accounting systems (58% see them as broadly absent) that 
do not seem to come as a complement of performance management by objective and 
indicators. This finding can be associated to another result emphasizing that only a small 
number of respondents perceive a clear reward (8%) or penalty (6%) for achieving objectives: 
while systems of management by results are indeed in place, their impact is limited and they 
are not much used as instruments of discipline or related to incentives.A second remarkable 
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„customer user surveys‟. A third specificity suggests that France nicely illustrates the type of 
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financial decisions and of staffing decisions (respectively 50% and 66% not present). In the 
French context, the „let the managers manage‟ slogan doesn‟t seem to be really implemented. 
The results also confirm well-known components of the traditional nature of personnel 
management rules in the French civil service and the highly controlled rules of recruitment 
and promotion. Accordingly, responses to questions on the quality of coordination clearly 
show the force of vertical, compartmentalized operation and fragmentation between 
ministries. Indeed, 87% of respondents to question 13 state that in the event of conflict 
between organizations, the usual preferred solution is to refer the problem up the hierarchy. 
This approach is by far the most dominant. Next comesthe decision to shift the problem to the 
political level (61%) and the establishment of an ad hoc project group (48% of respondents).  
 
Many mixed perceptions ofthe effects of administrative reforms 
 Compared to other top executives in other European countries, French top public 
officials are more critical about changes in the public sector. The general assessment of the 
global performance of the French public administration for the last five years (question 16) is 
marked bya significant negative bias. If we take a scale of 3, the negative views are 
predominant: 29% broadly worse vs. 16% broadly better. Generally speaking, all the 
judgments about performance vary according to the respondent‟s level of responsibility, 
becoming more critical the further down the hierarchy we go. On specific items, the most 
favourable assessments, indicating an improvement, are few and relate to costs (54% on scale 
3) and innovation (49%). This suggests a fairly restricted view of the improvements, since the 
first item reflects the numerous initiatives in the RGPP designed to cut spending, and the 
second refers to technological changes (e-government, Internet). By contrast, a large number 
of areas are perceived as having clearly declined. Certain perceptions of decline relate to the 
“external” effects arising from administrative action: the most remarkable (and the most 
worrying?) results in this sphere are that the senior executives surveyed consider that social 
cohesion has deteriorated (59% vs. 10%) along with citizen trust in government (59% vs. 
10%).  To a lesser degree, 45% of the respondents (vs. 23%) consider that citizen 
participation is also falling. The other clear perceptions of deterioration relate to the “internal” 
negative perception of the public sector and of the morale of its staff: 56% of respondents (vs. 
19%) thus believe that staff motivation has deteriorated and 52% (vs. 21%) that the 
attractiveness of the public sector (i.e. of the government) as an employer has diminished. 
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These results indicate a certain malaise amongst French senior executives and the sense of a 
government that is enfeebled and out of touch. It seems a long time since administrative 
reform measures place the emphasis on participation by civil servants and users (Rocard 
reform of 1989, Jeannot, 2003; Bezes, 2009) and the globally severe perception of reforms 
suggests a risk of reform fatigue from top executives coupled with the idea that reforms do 
not benefit to citizens as well as with negative side-effects on the place and role of the civil 
service in the French society.  
Another major issue of concern is the variations in reform‟ perceptions across the 
organizational layers of the French administration. One could talk about a French public 
administration with three distinct layers, differently affected by reforms. If we consider the 
total French sample of respondents (1193 responses), not used in this book, which includes 
the chief executives of the French ministerial regional units in addition to top bureaucrats 
from ministerial central administrations and agencies, we observe a major difference between 
agency directors and directors of regional ministerial units, representing central government 
ministries at regional and départemental levels. Agency directors declare to be the most 
exposed to market mechanisms (benchmarking, contracting out), cost accounting systems and 
user surveys while also seeingthemselves as highly autonomous compared to the two others 
and having the most positive perception of reform effects. By contrast, directors of regional 
and départementalministerial units see themselves as having little autonomy except in 
reorganizations and mergers‟ implementation, have a more negative perceptions of reform 
impacts (most of all at the départemental level) and have been specifically affected by 
mergers, downsizing and one stop shops. Besides, while agencies‟ chief executives perceive 
their organization as extending state provisions, heads of regional and départemental 
ministerial units perceive the opposite. These findings confirm that agencies, in France, have 
been at the leading edge of implementing PM tools compared to other government areas and 
also constitute the layer through which new public policies have been launched. By contrast, 
the regional ministerial state has been growingly subordinated through administrative reforms 
that reduce its autonomy because central administrations has made a strategic use of reforms 
to strengthen their steering over them.  
Conclusion 
After years of misleading discourses about France viewed as a laggard on the one hand 
and, on the other, more radical recent administrative reforms launched by President Sarkozy 
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with strong rhetoric of conviction and voluntarism, one could wonder what the COCOPS 
survey would emphasize. From the French findings, we conclude that administrative change 
did occur and was perceived by top executives as a complete opposite picture of what were 
administrative reform policies in the 1980s and early 1990s. Reforms have been perceived as 
structural, top-down, comprehensive and without participation of public agents or trade 
unions. As for trends, reforms have emphasised mergers, downsizing and digital tools but 
performance management has also been developed in the French case. From this, have 
resulted perceived internal tensions within the French administration (demotivation, 
contradictory assessments of the impacts of reforms and of the performance of the French 
administration, strong differences between layers of government such as the opposition 
between agencies and territorial ministerial units, etc.). However, in a comparative 
perspective, these significant transformations can be nuanced when confronted to the 
COCOPS observations that that the French administration is far from having beenNPMized 
and belongs to the second group of European countries, together with other Continental 
(Germany) and Southern countries (Italy) where reforms have not been as intense and 
systematic as they were in Nordic, British or Dutch areas.  
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